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The raising of bridge tolls in the peak period on the San FranciscoOakland Bay Bridge in California in mid-2010 provides a rare opportunity to assess traffic impacts. Carpoolers who previously traveled for free during peak hours were charged an electronic toll under this variable pricing scheme. On the basis of 29 months of time series data, the introduction of carpool charges had a stronger impact on traffic volumes than did peak period pricing of regular traffic. The estimated short-term elasticity of about 0.30 suggests significant numbers of peak hour carpoolers did not travel, switched routes, shifted to public transit, or opted to drive alone. More than half the loss in carpool traffic was estimated to be attributable to the toll increase, a far stronger influence than factors such as rising gasoline prices and unemployment. The estimated elasticity of regular traffic in response to variable pricing was 0.23, an indication that peak period motorists were fairly insensitive to pricing and a reflection of the nondiscretionary nature of many peak hour journeys. It will be important to track trends over time to gain insights into the longer term sensitivity of motorists to variable pricing on natural corridors such as the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge.
Charging motorists more to use roads and bridges during peak periods has long been prescribed as one of the most effective ways of relieving traffic congestion (1, 2) . If prices are properly set, charging peak period motorists more than those traveling in the off peak can ration scarce road capacity while also generating revenues, which can be used for covering rising maintenance costs, expanding public transport (for those potentially priced off the road), and other purposes.
The raising of bridge tolls on the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge in California on July 1, 2010, provides one of the few U.S. examples in which true peak load pricing is now being applied on a major highway facility, in this case a bridge crossing. The toll increase introduced time-of-day pricing on the bridge facility. This occurred through raising bridge tolls from $4 to $6 during peak hours (5 to 10 a.m. and 3 to 7 p.m.) and retaining the previous $4 toll for all other periods, except weekends when a $5 toll is charged. Peak hour motorists thus ended up paying a 50% surcharge relative to what they previously paid and relative to those who travel during non-peak weekday hours. Also the practice of allowing free pas-and unemployment rates. In addition, because the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) heavy rail service operates through a tube along the Bay Bridge corridor and thus represents a substitutable mode, monthly data on BART service levels (e.g., the number of rail car units), average fares, and ridership were also compiled. Data for other variables that might sway bridge traffic volumes, such as monthly attendance at the AT&T sports stadium near the bridge's western terminus in San Francisco, were collected as well.
Before the model results are presented, it is useful to track trends for some of these variables during the 29-month period. Figure 1 shows monthly trends for peak total vehicles (passenger cars on regular lanes, multiaxle vehicles, and all vehicles using HOV lanes), peak vehicles using HOV lanes, and total vehicles (i.e., all vehicles for all hours of the day and days of the week during the month). The graph shows that the toll hike was accompanied by a precipitous decline in traffic using the HOV lane, which fell from 367,473 vehicles in June 2010 to 270,210 in July 2010-more than a 25% drop in 1 month. Total peak hour traffic volumes, however, generally held their own for the first few months following the toll hike. Moreover, total Bay Bridge traffic volumes (peak and non-peak) actually rose the first few months after the toll increase. Daily volumes were perhaps at least stabilized by motorists switching their times of travel to the edges of the off-peak (e.g., before 5 a.m. or after 10 a.m.) to save $2 in the westbound direction (which is the only direction for which tolls are collected; eastbound bridge traffic crosses free). Former carpoolers opting to drive alone also added to the daily count of vehicles. Although non-HOV Bay Bridge traffic tended to remain stable several months following the toll hike, by late fall 2010, all traffic volumes began to taper, reaching a particularly low point in February-partly the result of fewer days in the month, however, more likely the result of the lingering effects of the economic recession and steadily rising gasoline prices.
Regional trends in these two important exogenous variablesgasoline prices and unemployment rate-are shown in Figure 2 . Soon after the average bridge toll rose by nearly 27% in 1 month (June to July 2010), the region's average gasoline price began trending upward, reaching nearly $4.20 per gallon for regular unleaded in spring 2011, among the highest rates in the nation. Gasoline prices more than doubled during the 29-month period shown in Figure 2 . The San Francisco Bay Area's unemployment rate, although still fairly high at more than 10% in fall 2010, had largely stabilized following the toll increase, suggesting its influence on traffic volumes was likely not as strong as that of rising gasoline prices. Figure 2 also shows that BART ridership remained fairly flat during the 29-month period, showing some patterns of seasonality (e.g., dips in December). Although factors such as rising gasoline prices and bridge tolls might have spurred some travelers to take BART, the economic recession could have had a counterbalancing effect, resulting in stable ridership figures.
MoDeling DeManD iMpacts
Higher bridge tolls should curb the demand for motor vehicle travel, and peak surcharges should exact an even more pronounced effect on peak period travel. Because carpools and other users of the HOV lane previously traveled free, the effects of a new bridge toll on this group, bridge officials predicted, would be particularly strong, which is suggested by trend lines in Figure 1 .
In estimating a predictive model, it is necessary to separate out the influences of higher bridge tolls and peak load pricing on traffic volumes from other factors that also influence travel over time. These include not only exogenous factors such as gasoline prices and unemployment rates, but more endogenous ones as well, that is, they are within the sphere of public policy influence. Perhaps most notable is the presence of a high-speed heavy rail service along the transbay corridor, BART. Accordingly, monthly data were compiled on BART service levels (expressed in rail car units), average fares, and ridership (stratified by peak, non-peak, and total hours) for train services operating through the transbay tube. Additional variables compiled that could influence travel demand along the transbay corridor included Bay Bridge levels of service reflected by average travel speeds and average peak period travel times queuing for passage through the toll gates, number of Spare the Air days each month (when various media actively encourage travelers to take public transit or share rides because of high air pollution levels), monthly attendance at AT&T Stadium (home of the San Francisco Giants) near the bridge's western terminus, number of days of bridge lane closures during the 5 a.m. to 10 p.m. period, and an adjustment for the number of days in each month (relative to a value of 30; thus with 31 days, the month of January was assigned a value of 1.033, i.e., 31/30, and February was assigned a value of 0.933, i.e., 28/30).
Because of the limited number of time series data points, models had to be carefully specified to allow key predictor variables of interest to be studied and at the same time minimize the inefficiencies introduced when predictors are highly correlated among themselves. For example, rising gasoline prices most likely had a hand in reducing business transactions and thus employment rates, which Figure 2 suggests might have been the case during the first part of the time series.
The models of Bay Bridge traffic volumes presented in this paper were estimated by initially including available endogenous and exogenous variables in the equations, as outlined above, guided by traditional utility-based theories of travel demand (3, 4) . Thus variables on bridge tolls and service levels, BART fares and service levels, incidences (e.g., Spare the Air days, bridge closures), and various statistical controls (e.g., gasoline prices, unemployment rates, days-in-month adjustment) were initially included in all models. In part because of the relatively small number of time series data points but also because of the presence of statistical problems such as multicollinearity, highly insignificant variables were purged from the initial model. The variable on Bay Bridge service levels (e.g., average queuing times to toll gates), for example, was highly insignificant because it remained largely unchanged during the 29-month time series. For regular lanes, queuing times did decline for the first few months following the toll hike but soon returned to historical levels, suggesting a possible induced traffic effect (5, 6) . For the HOV lanes, average queuing times did not change very much during the peak because there was free passage before the toll increase and mandatory use of FasTrak electronic tags after the increase. Thus although economic theory holds that roadway service levels should influence demand, in the case of the Bay Bridge corridor, their influence was minimal and thus did not enter predictive models.
A similar situation existed for variables related to BART service levels and prices. Because the Bay Bridge and BART are alternative, substitutable connectors of Oakland and San Francisco, economic theory holds changes in prices and service levels should have reciprocal effects on demand for the two options. For example, shifts from motorized travel to BART in response to the higher bridge tolls might be expected to prompt BART managers to run more trains during the peak, which would further influence mode choice. However the transbay corridor is not a privately run, competitive marketplace, with agents seeking to maximize profits, but rather a corridor in which prices and transit service levels are governed by public institutions. Strapped for funding, BART did not intensify services in anticipation of mode shifts from the higher and time-differentiated bridge tolls. In fact, the monthly number of rail cars passing through BART's transbay tube fell by more than 4% during the first 6 months of the Bay Bridge toll hike (July 2010 to January 2011). Instead of service expansion, peak rail services were marked by more crowded trains. Although monthly data on the number of rail cars (for all of BART and for transbay services) and mean BART fares were compiled, these variables were highly insignificant for all models. In regard to model estimation, moreover, prices, service levels, and demand did not simultaneously influence each other, as in the case of private transportation service providers, thus there was no need to econometrically estimate models by using instrument variables or structural equation modeling. Rather, ordinary least squares estimation was used. Because the presence of BART as a potentially cheaper mode did influence Bay Bridge traffic following the toll increase, monthly ridership was used as a predictor variable to reflect the relative drawing power of BART as a substitutable mode. Thus ridership, not service levels, was used to express the relative influences of BART's presence on Bay Bridge traffic volumes during the time series.
Last, a secular trend variable (January 2009 = 1, February 2009 = 2, etc.) was initially applied to models. Because a number of other controls (e.g., average gasoline prices) were similarly trending upward over the time series, this variable was unnecessary and thus was omitted in the final models.
effects of toll on HoV traffic During peak perioDs
For carpools, motorcyclists, and other HOV lane users traveling during peak hours, going from free passage on June 30, 2010, to a $2.50 toll on July 1, 2010, marked a stark change in the treatment of these small footprint travel modes. There was perhaps more political sensitivity to a possible public backlash to this new toll than there was to any other part of the new toll regime, including differentiating tolls by time-of-day and day-of-the-week. Table 1 shows the estimated model that yielded the best statistical fit while also producing results that matched theory and expectations. Because a log-log model was estimated, coefficients can be interpreted as point elasticities. The variable HOV toll could not be expressed in logarithmic form because there was no toll before July 2010. In the log-log model, the toll applied to HOV lanes was treated as a binary event-from a free service to a tolled one-by using a 0-1 dummy variable, with the coefficient treated and interpreted as an elasticity like other variables in the model (7 ). Imputing an elasticity on the basis of an initial price of zero is admittedly problematic; thus the precise value of the estimate is less important than its general order of magnitude. Overall, the model in Table 1 explained 92% of the variation in peak HOV lane traffic during the 29-month period.
Carpools and other vehicles using the bridge's HOV lane were, in general, only moderately sensitive to the exaction of a $2.50 toll. The estimated elasticity of about −0.30 is in line with the shortterm elasticities recorded for time-of-day road pricing schemes introduced in Spain and the United Kingdom (8) and considerably lower than elasticities imputed for variable pricing schemes applied in Singapore and Southern California (9) . Computationally simple shrinkage ratios and log arc elasticities were reported in these studies, and their traffic operational contexts were somewhat different from that of the Bay Bridge; thus there are limits to comparative insights that can be gained. The imputed price elasticity −0.30 is considerably higher than the −0.15 figure estimated for a Golden Gate Bridge toll increased in 1992 for all times of day (10) and the −0.05 value estimated for the Bay Bridge when the toll rose from $0.75 to $1.00 in 1988 (11). Table 1 also reveals that although less statistically significant, the presence of BART (as represented by the proxy variable BART peak ridership) appeared to influence the bridge's HOV traffic volumes during the peak period. So did rising regional gasoline prices and unemployment rates, which depressed HOV lane traffic over the time series (although based on the elasticities and beta coefficients, not as much as the HOV toll itself). Incidences of poor air quality, when Spare the Air public announcements (www.sparetheair.org) encouraged motorists to share rides or take alternative modes, appeared to boost HOV lane usage.
The board of the Bay Area Toll Authority asked for estimates of how recent losses in HOV lane traffic might have been distributed among various factors such as the introduction of a toll, availability of BART, escalating gasoline prices, and rising unemployment. This was done by using the standardized coefficients, or beta weights, in the predicted model. Beta weights reflect the relative explanatory power of predictor variables. They allow factors influencing HOV lane traffic during the time series to be apportioned. The following formula was applied for that purpose: The formula states that the share of variation in Bay Bridge traffic explained by variable i represents its beta weight relative to the Note: Dependent variable = HOV traffic volume; prob. = probability; na = not applicable. All variables expressed as natural logarithms except HOV toll. N = 29; F = 41.00; prob. = .000; R 2 = .918.
sum of all beta weights in the model, adjusted for the share of total variation explained by the model. For purposes of creating a pie chart that apportioned the loss in HOV lane traffic during the time series, an "other" category was created that represented the influences (based on beta weights) of the Spare the Air day and number of days in month variables along with the share of variation in the dependent variable unexplained by the model (i.e., 1 − R 2 ). This approach ensured that the influences of key variables of policy interest-that is, toll, BART, gasoline prices, and unemployment rates-plus a catch-all category of "other" summed to 100%. Figure 3 shows the resulting pie chart. Overall, it is estimated that about 54% of the HOV lane traffic losses were due to the introduction of a $2.50 toll. BART, it was estimated, absorbed about 10% of the lost HOV lane traffic (in its role as a substitutable mode along the transbay corridor). Smaller shares of the traffic losses were due to rising regional gasoline prices and unemployment. Nearly one-quarter of the changes in HOV lane traffic were due to other factors such as Spare the Air incidences and variables not explicitly accounted for in the model (including possible route shifts of former Bay Bridge motorists switching to other, albeit typically more circuitous, bay crossings).
Besides switching to BART, what happened to former carpoolers who no longer crossed the Bay Bridge? Most did not become drivealone bridge crossers, which can be deduced as follows. The average daily traffic on HOV lanes fell by 4,265 vehicles from 1 year before to 1 year after the July 1, 2010, introduction of peak period HOV lane charges. At three persons per vehicle (the minimum needed to use HOV lanes), this means some 13,000 fewer people were traveling the HOV lanes each day. If all of these individuals became solo drivers, there would be some 13,000 more vehicles paying tolls on regular Bay Bridge lanes. However, only an average of 3,300 more vehicles were on these regular lanes from 1 year before to 1 year after the toll hike. Instead of driving alone, former carpool members that did not switch to BART either changed routes (e.g., took an alternative but more circuitous bridge crossing), became passengers in two-occupant vehicles, or forwent trips formerly made on the bridge (choosing instead, for example, to go to an East Bay destination).
effects of toll on total peak traffic VoluMes
What effects did higher tolls have on all traffic crossing the bridge during peak hours-that is, vehicles using the HOV lanes and regular (non-HOV) lanes? For most motorists, the $2 peak toll represented a small portion of the $15 to $30 average round-trip expense of driving from the East Bay to San Francisco (which includes the toll plus parking and average per-mile costs for fuel, insurance, depreciation, etc.). Of course, except for parking, these other costs are largely hidden in the minds of most motorists, assumed away as a subscription fee of living in a car-oriented society (12) . Tolls, however, can be more conspicuous, especially when cash is paid, thus for many, the cognitive effects of a $2 toll hike are not inconsequential. Table 2 shows the best-fitting, most interpretable model estimated for predicting effects of the average toll hike on peak period traffic volumes, with log-linear specification and ordinary least squares estimation. A separate model was also estimated for Note: Dependent variable = total peak period traffic volume, including multiaxle vehicles and motorcycles. All variables expressed as natural logarithms. N = 29; F = 0.96; prob. = .000; R 2 = .684.
predicting effects on peak period non-HOV traffic (e.g., non-carpools and multiaxle vehicles using regular lanes); however the results were quite similar to those in Table 2 and thus are not presented here. The estimated short-term price elasticity of −0.233 indicates that most motorists were willing to absorb the higher bridge toll, which is again consistent with findings of past research that peak period travelers are fairly price insensitive (9) . Those priced off the bridge were presumably previously making more discretionary or lower value-added trips. Some no doubt shifted to the lower-priced shoulders of the weekday peak (e.g., before 5 a.m. and after 10 a.m.). And some opted for alternative routes. BART also appears to have attracted some former peak period motorists (with again BART ridership serving as a stand-in metric for the availability of transbay rail service as an alternative mode).
The relative influences of the variables in explaining changes in total peak period traffic on the Bay Bridge were estimated by applying the beta weights and goodness-of-fit statistic in Table 2 to Equation 1. The pie chart in Figure 4 reveals that other factors not explained by the model (including possible route shifts) had the dominant influence on changes in total peak period bridge traffic during the 29-month period. The bridge toll itself was estimated to account for 17% of the changes in peak traffic volume, followed in relative importance by the presence of BART as an alternative mode and rising gasoline prices.
BART's role in absorbing traffic priced off the Bay Bridge is reflected in Figure 5 . From April/May 2010 to April/May 2011, BART's ridership in the a.m. peak increased 8% in the westbound direction (i.e., the direction in which bridge tolls are collected). Because BART did not increase train capacity during this period, commute-hour rail services became more crowded.
Part of the peak period traffic losses were due to motorists switching to the shoulders of the morning peak, that is, before 5 a.m. and after 10 a.m. The resultant model, shown in Table 3 , explained 73% of the variation in total monthly traffic volumes during the 29-month period. Table 3 reveals that every dollar increase in average toll during the time series was associated with a loss of 103,600 motorized vehicles crossing the bridge each month, all else being equal. The estimated midpoint line elasticity is −0.119, derived from multiplying the regression coefficient (−103.6) by the ratio of mean values for the explanatory variable [average toll ($4.228)] and dependent variable [total monthly traffic (3,684, expressed in 1,000s)]. The relationship between average toll and monthly traffic volumes, however, was not statistically significant at the 5% probability level. Among variables measuring attributes of BART services, the best predictor was the average BART adult fare level. Higher BART prices for transbay trips appeared to induce more bridge travel although the relationship was not statistically significant. Higher unemployment and bridge closures cut into monthly bridge traffic volumes. Events at AT&T Park had a stimulating effect. Most highattendance stadium events do not occur in the peak period, thus although AT&T Park attendance did not enter into the peak period models as a significant predictor, for the model of total monthly traffic, which encompasses non-peak and weekend periods, it did. Last, because of the insignificance of average tolls and the absence of key variables such as average gasoline prices and BART ridership from this model, no attempt was made to create a pie chart that apportions effects among explanatory variables.
conclusion
The introduction of higher charges for crossing the Bay Bridge during peak periods is one of the few examples of peak load pricing of a busy highway corridor in the United States today. Economists have long touted peak period tolling as an efficient way to ration road space and relieve traffic congestion. Although studying the effects on traffic conditions was not the focus of this study, the results did suggest that the higher tolls had an appreciable effect on bridge traffic volumes. For the most part, the empirical results matched expectations. Most motorists and carpoolers appeared willing to absorb the higher toll charges even though the price increases were not inconsequential, particularly for HOV lane travelers. Bridge tolls exerted far stronger influences on Bay Bridge carpool traffic volumes than other factors, such as economic conditions and gasoline prices. The estimated short-term elasticity of about −0.30 suggests significant shares of vehicles using the HOV lane during peak periods forwent travel, switched routes, shifted to transit, or opted to drive alone. According to the apportionment method presented in this paper, more than half of the loss in carpool traffic was attributed to the introduction of an HOV lane toll, whereas less than 25% of the loss in traffic, it is estimated, was the result of carpoolers switching over to BART or of rising unemployment or gasoline prices.
Regular (non-HOV lane) traffic appeared to be less sensitive to the higher peak period charges. In difficult economic times, motorists appear willing to absorb higher fees for essential travel such as the journey to work. These findings are generally consistent with those reported for other time-of-day road pricing schemes introduced in the United States and abroad (8, 9) .
The analyses presented in this paper speak largely to the efficiency implications of peak period road pricing. Yet equity considerations often form a political stumbling block to the introduction of congestion tolls (13, 14) . To the degree that those priced off the Bay Bridge are of lower income and are economically hurt the most, remedies could be considered. Among these would be to channel some of the revenue gains to expand transbay BART services (which generally have not been expanded since the introduction of higher bridge tolls). Reduced crowding on transbay trains during peak hours would benefit riders across the income spectrum. Possible regressive effects could also be redressed through voucherswhether in the form of subsidized BART fare payments or partial rebates to monthly FasTrak bills for needy populations.
The results presented in this paper reflect just 29 months of time series data and only 11 months of post-toll-hike observations. Accordingly, they gauge short-term effects. It will be important to monitor trends and relationships over time. Ideally, follow-up work will be conducted to measure intermediate term (e.g., 24-to 36-month) and longer term (e.g., 48-to 72-month) effects. Such knowledge should be of value in informing future tolling decisions concerning the Bay Bridge and other natural corridors where congestion pricing is being considered.
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